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News
Counter-Revolution in Grandparent Visitation Rules
Courts across the nation are engaged in a thorough reconsideration of grandparent visitation laws, sharply 
curtailing them or, in some cases, simply ruling them unconstitutional.
At common law, grandparents had no rights to visitation. Beginning in the 1960s, New York and 
ultimately all 50 states adopted some form of grandparent visitation law. While some saw this as evidence 
of humanitarian lawmaking, others saw it as a victory of extensive lobbying by the AARP and other 
groups determined to create new entitlements for an older generation of voters. These rights came at the 
expense of a large but diverse and unorganized group of citizens known as parents.
The new rights often hinged on some variant of the best interests of the child test. This highly contestable 
standard spawned a kind of litigation that was far from humanitarian. Consider, for example, the recent 
New Jersey case of Wilde v. Wilde. Within months after their son committed suicide by shooting himself 
with a handgun in front of his wife, the man's parents sued their daughter-in-law for visitation with the 
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couple's child. In court papers the paternal grandparents called the wife a vicious, greedy, vindictive liar 
and claimed that her spendthrift ways caused her husband to overwork, implying she was partly 
responsible for his suicide. The grandparents' attack included questioning the wife's mental stability and 
her mothering ability. Court ordered psychological evaluation produced no evidence that showed her to be 
unfit in any way. The bitter case finally ended when the Appellate Division ruled that the statute, as 
applied in such circumstances, violated the mother's fundamental right to raise her child as she saw fit.
In June 2000, in Troxel v. Granville, the U.S. Supreme Court confronted one of the nation's most 
sweeping visitation statutes, enacted by the state of Washington. It allowed any person to seek visitation 
with a child at any time, if it would be in the best interest of the child. Tommie Granville, a mother of two 
whose husband, Brad, committed suicide, allowed Brad's parents to continue seeing the children after the 
suicide, but not as frequently as they wanted. Dissatisfied, the Troxels sued Tommie, pursuing their claim 
through years of litigation to the Supreme Court.
Despite the often controversial nature of the substantive due process doctrine, a clear majority of the 
justices agreed that parents have a due process liberty right to the care, custody and control of their own 
children. The justices found the state statute as applied in the Troxel case was unconstitutional, because 
the state trial judge had simply substituted his own judgment about what was best for the child for that of 
the admittedly fit mother.
On the key issue of when a state can justifiably infringe on the parent's right to decide with whom the 
child associates, the plurality would only say that the state must presume parents are acting in the best 
interests of their children and give parental decisions special weight.
The Troxel decision left unanswered several important questions. Must states use strict scrutiny in judging 
the constitutionality of statutory infringements on parental freedom? How strong is the presumption 
favoring parental decision-making, and what sort of evidence is sufficient to overcome it? Can states 
override parental decisions on visitation only to prevent significant harm to the child?
Some state supreme courts have answered these questions, both before and after the Troxel decision. High 
courts of Illinois, Connecticut, Georgia, Oklahoma, Florida and Tennessee have held that to avoid 
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infringement of parental constitutional rights, grandparents must prove that denying visitation would 
cause substantial harm to the child. The courts have applied strict scrutiny to ensure that visitation rules 
are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Connecticut added its own requirement that 
harm to the child be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
States have been sensitive to the notion, articulated best in Justice Anthony M. Kennedy's dissent in the 
Troxel case, that litigation itself can constitute state intervention that is so disruptive of the parent-child 
relationship that the constitutional right of a parent to make certain basic determinations for the child's 
welfare is implicated. He noted that attorney's fees alone might destroy a single mother's hopes and plans 
for her child. In a similar vein, Maine's high court cited the expense, stress and pain of visitation litigation 
as a reason to raise legal barriers to deny standing to grandparents in all but the most urgent cases.
In Troxel, state courts were left to determine whether their own visitation statutes were salvageable by 
resort to judicial interpretations that rein in overly broad statutory authorizations to impose visitation on 
fit parents. The New York Court of Appeals needs to revisit the issue, which it addressed in the 1991 case 
of Emanuel S. v. Joseph E. That decision established relatively low threshold requirements for 
grandparents to meet, even allowing suits against married parents who were in agreement on their 
opposition to visitation. The New York statute confers automatic standing on grandparents whose child 
has died, providing no mechanism to deter these intrusive proceedings or to challenge them at the outset.
The Court of Appeals did not address constitutional concerns in Emanuel S. With the perspective 
provided by Troxel, and by other state high court decisions, it is imperative that New York take steps to 
cabin this litigation, with its potential to heighten family tensions, destroy family finances and invade 
family privacy. In addition to the restrictions noted above, the Court, should it choose to save our overly 
broad statute, might incorporate a suggestion of the Wilde court - that before starting litigation, 
grandparents should be obliged to make substantial efforts at repairing the breach in their relations with 
the parent, making respectful and patient overtures. Further, the litigation itself should be conducted with 
restraint. In other words, the grandparents must refrain from denouncing, demeaning, and impugning the 
parent's character.
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Or the Court might simply acknowledge that the delicate effort to repair dysfunctional human 
relationships with the iron club of litigation is so misguided as to violate our own state constitutional 
protections for parents and their children.
Stephen A. Newman is a law professor at New York Law School.
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